DEFINING ORGANISATIONAL POLITICS by Cacciattolo, Karen
European Scientific Journal  August 2014  /SPECIAL/ edition   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
238 
DEFINING ORGANISATIONAL POLITICS 
 
 
 
Karen Cacciattolo 
University of Malta, Malta 
 
 
Abstract 
The paper discusses the type of political behaviour, mainly Mintzberg’s (1985) 
collection of games, Allen et al’s (1979) individual political tactics, and Lawrence et al’s 
(2005) types of power, as well as the causes of political behaviour. Some argue that politics 
are rooted in the wider configured environment (Gotsis & Kortezi, 2010: 498), while others 
argue that politics are a result of interpersonal antagonisms (Vince, 2001) or emotional 
matters (Vince, 2002).  With regards to organisational politics, the literature presents various 
types of political behaviours, and research to date tackled the area of politics mostly in a 
purely theoretical manner.  Moreover, studies presented to date have paid more attention to 
the general perceptions of politics rather than the observable political behaviours. 
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Introduction 
Aristotle (1934) portrayed the idea of politics as a ‘master-craft’ and thus is a 
tolerable and practical social phenomenon (Provis in Vigoda-Gadot & Drory, 2006: 98).  
However, in general, organisational politics is often defined as the behaviour that is aimed at 
safeguarding the self interest of an individual at the cost of another (Allen et al, 1979: 77; 
Drory & Vigoda-Gadot, 2010: 195; Ferris et al, 1989: 145; Gotsis & Kortezi, 2010: 498; 
Latif et al, 2011; Vigoda-Gadot & Kapun, 2005: 252), and this behaviour often conflicts with 
the organisational goals (Ladebo, 2006: 259; Sussman et al, 2002: 314; Vigoda-Gadot, 2007: 
665).    Consequently, according to Beugré & Liverpool (in Vigoda-Gadot & Drory, 2006), 
organisational politics is an ‘antisocial’ behaviour (2006: 124).   
It is argued that the overt tendency for politicking is a human nature aspect that is a 
consequent of evolution, and the human nature drive for politicking is associated with power 
endeavouring, and derives from the interaction between the distribution of tasks and rank 
delineation (Vredenburgh & Shea Van-Fossen, 2010: 33).   Meriac & Villanova (in Vigoda-
Gador & Drory, 2006) argue that some people ought to benefit from the political tactics or 
else there would be no reason for them to engage in political behaviour (2006: 17).   Liu et al 
(in Vigoda-Gadot & Drory, 2006) argue that individuals who benefit from political behaviour 
may go through feelings of pleasure and even exhilaration, especially when favourable results 
are only achievable through illegitimate strategies (2006: 168) 
Organisational politics can also be viewed as a group phenomenon where people do 
not necessarily engage in politics just as individuals.   Informal groups are often created 
within the workplace and various types of coalitions have a tendency to grow among 
individuals (Romm & Pliskin, 1997: 96; Seo, 2003: 11).    James (in Vigoda-Gadot & Drory, 
2006) argues that group politics may be encouraged or weakened by the organisational 
cultural values, which may also mould the route that the group politics will take (2006: 56).  
Among the many types of groups, these may consist of either managers and subordinates in a 
department, employees that fall in the same hierarchical level, or employees that fall in the 
same social circle.  Political behaviour may also be present between other stakeholders of an 
organisation, such as unions and employers (Romm & Pliskin, 1997) though these macro-
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scale politics are not the primary focus of this thesis’ particular study.  According to Romm 
& Pliskin (1997) the amount of politicking intensifies as the issue concerned is presumed as 
significant from the concerned group’s position.  
 
Causes of Organisational Politics 
According to Vredenburgh & Shea-VanFossen (2010), some research has identified 
organisational conditions that cause employees to engage in workplace political behaviours.  
They argue that the origins of individual attributes and the nature of their interactions with 
organisational conditions that foster political strategies in work organisations come from the 
evolution of an individual’s hereditary genetic structure (Vredenburgh & Shea-VanFossen, 
2010: 27).  According to Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution, there is a distinction amid 
species and a change method of natural selection, which focused on the relationship between 
a being and its milieu, wherein a competitive effort for resources is acknowledged 
(Vredenburgh & Shea-VanFossen, 2010: 28).   This means that key attributes and behaviours 
have evolved as a result of the process of natural selection, in which better adapted organisms 
outlive those less in shape despite several challenges (Vredenburgh & Shea-VanFossen, 
2010: 29).  Therefore, from this biological evolutionary perspective, human beings have 
inherent behavioural tendencies to engage in politicking (Vredenburgh & Shea-VanFossen, 
2010: 31).    
However, Vredenburgh & Shea-VanFossen (2010) also argue that not all traits or 
behaviours are entirely genetic in origin, since some are derived interactively from biological 
elements and cultural circumstances (2010: 31).  Nevertheless the consequential traits and 
behaviours can surface in various individual surroundings, including workplaces, in which 
they could encourage organisational politics (Vredenburgh & Shea-VanFossen, 2010: 31).   
According to Beugré & Liverpool (in Vigoda-Gadot & Drory, 2006) if employees perceive 
that they are being manipulated or their interests are ignored, then they will end up engaging 
in self-serving behaviour (2006: 130).  Similarly, Nicholson (1997) argues that humans have 
an innate predisposition towards power striving, which can cause workplace political 
behaviours where it comes into tension with the division of labour and status segregation.  In 
the same kind of vein, Lubit (2002) argues that, narcissism, a facet which constituted the first 
stage of human species development, is another aspect of the human nature that enhances 
organisational politics (Vredenburgh & Shea-VanFossen, 2010: 35).  
In view of the above, a number of studies have promoted the view that some degree of 
predisposition towards politicking may be an innate part of human nature, but that this 
predisposition becomes most visible in workplaces where the objectives of the organisation 
are unclear, there is a limitation of resources, there is a fast changing technological and 
environmental aspect, and the decisions are unplanned (Curtis, 2003: 293; Gotsis & Kortezi, 
2010: 498; Ladebo, 2006: 256; Latif et al, 2011: 199; Poon, 2003: 138; Vredenburgh & Shea-
VanFossen, 2010: 42). The larger the difficulty in such cases, the more sensitive is the 
political behaviour in which conflicts arise and ambiguity abounds (Ladebo, 2006: 261).   
Beugré & Liverpool (in Vigoda-Gadot & Drory, 2006) state that individuals engaging 
in political behaviour often treat others with disrespect and try to thwart formal procedures, 
especially when these procedures are not clear (2006: 129).  As such, research has identified 
several areas in which employees engage in political behaviour, namely pressures for 
economy, management and subordinates relationships, structural power struggles between 
configured groups such as unions and employers, conflicts between the workforce and 
management for construing agreements, uncertainty about standards and strategies of 
promotion, difficulty in linking reward with productivity, and policies and procedures (Gotsis 
& Kortezi, 2010: 499; Latif et al, 2011: 203). 
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Indeed, individuals are more likely to engage in political behaviour when there is 
uncertainty involved in decision-making procedures and performance measures, and when 
competition is present among individuals and groups for limited resources (Gotsis & Kortezi, 
2010: 499; Othman, 2008: 43; Poon, 2003: 142).  Moreover, according to Vigoda-Gadot 
(2007) the lack of nominal integrity and equality in these systems is a main root of higher 
perceptions of organisational politics (2007: 665).  In organisations that adopt clear decision-
making processes and where competitive behaviour is less, a high level of political behaviour 
is not likely to be present.     
According to James (in Vigoda-Gadot & Drory, 2006) the increase of internal 
organisational politics may be due to the external competitive demands experienced by 
organisations, resulting from globalised economies and technological transformations (2006: 
62).   James also mentions the example of Tilly (in Vigoda-Gadot & Drory, 2006) wherein it 
is identified that severe and explicit negative politics are mostly present in low-resource 
countries (2006: 62). 
Last but not least, according to Buchanan (2008), politics may also be caused by 
structural relationships within an organisation (2008: 54); one group of employees may have 
particular performance indicators and tasks to fulfil that are very different to those of another 
group.  Jehn (1997) refers to these diversities as task-focused conflicts.  According to Jehn, 
these types of conflicts may be beneficial to an organisation since they improve the decision-
making results and output through constructive criticism (Jehn, 1997: 532).  However, it is 
also likely that these task-related conflicts change into relationship conflicts, resulting into 
one group or individual disliking another group or individual and attach these task-related 
conflicts to personality issues (Jehn, 1997: 532).   
In her study, Jehn also identified a process conflict, which includes a “responsibility 
disagreement”, meaning that incongruities occur regarding who is responsible for what; these 
also can lead to personality issues (1997: 540).   It is therefore unavoidable that the agenda of 
each group or individual will differ or even conflict on some issues, and this shows how 
much political behaviour takes place due to the structural tensions within an organisation. 
Therefore politics is not just something that surfaces out of personal differences; it is often 
produced by tensions that exist between one function or category of employees and another; 
tensions which can often create irritation and frustration (Jehn, 1997).   
 
Types of Individual Political Behaviour in Organisations 
Sussman et al (2002) argue that political behaviour in organisations often conveys a 
normative, unethical implication (2002: 314).  They confirm this through their quantitative 
study which they carried out regarding seven types of political behaviour in organisations as 
illustrated by Allen et al (1979), and their influence on communication media.  The types of 
behaviour used in the study include: (1) Attacking or blaming others, (2) Using information 
as a political tool, (3) Creating a favourable image (impression management), (4) Developing 
a base of support, (5) Praising others (ingratiation), (6) Forming power coalitions with allies, 
and (7) Creating obligations (reciprocity).  As will be seen, these types constitute an 
important part of the analytical framework of this study, and so merit some further 
explanation here. 
Attacking or blaming others is a tactic that includes both reactive and proactive 
behaviours.  Allen et al (1979) state that the reactive behaviour involves scapegoating: more 
specifically, the individual concerned in this behaviour avoids his or her involvement with a 
detrimental or failing situation at work (1979: 78).  On the other hand, proactive behaviour 
involves an individual making a rival look bad in the eyes of significant members of the 
organisation (Allen et al, 1979: 78).  Using information as a political tool includes individuals 
who engage in preserving, twisting or using information to devastate another individual.   
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Impression management involves an individual building and enhancing his or her self 
image by developing a reputation of being liked and being enthusiastic, to mention a few 
characteristics (Allen et al, 1979: 79).  Drory & Vigoda-Gadot (2010) argue that impression 
management behaviour is one of the key strategies of organisational politics and is affected 
by cultural differences (2010: 198).  In addition, Drory & Zaidman (in Vigoda-Gadot & 
Drory, 2006) state that impression management is beneficial and critical for career 
advancement, since merit alone is not sufficient (2006: 76).  Drory & Zaidman further state 
that individuals who are likely to engage in impression management are often seeking to 
increase their compensation, preserve their self-esteem, and obtain limited available resources 
by ingratiating their boss (in Vigoda-Gadot & Drory, 2006: 77). 
Developing a base of support happens when a manager gets others to understand his 
or her ideas before making a decision and makes his or her subordinates feel as if the idea is 
theirs to guarantee their dedication (Allen et al, 1979: 80).  Ingratiation occurs when an 
individual praises another in order to create a good rapport.  In their study, Allen et al (1979) 
state that lower level employees use more ‘colourful’ expressions like “buttering up the 
boss” to explain this tactic (1979: 80).  Meriac & Villanova (in Vigoda-Gadot & Drory, 
2006) refer to ingratiation as that ‘friendliness’ which endeavours to transform the notion a 
target has of the influencer so the target may be leaning towards providing the influencer with 
what he or she wishes (2006: 16).  Forming power coalitions with allies is a tactic which is 
used by individuals that associate themselves with influential persons in an organisation or in 
social situations to gain popularity or feel important.  Last but not least, reciprocity involves 
performing services or favours to create obligations – a very applicable expression is “You 
scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours” (Allen et al, 1979: 80). 
The findings of Sussman et al (2002) indicate that political tactics are both channel 
and sender specific. Moreover, attempts to influence others through self-serving messages are 
more likely to be sent through certain channels than others and are more likely to come from 
certain organisational roles than others (Sussman et al, 2002: 325).  In this regard, Allen et al 
(1979) argue that politicking occurs more frequently at higher managerial and professional 
levels of an organisation, whilst supervisors may be less able to practice politics successfully 
due to their minimal power (1979: 82).   
Others argue that organisational politics are highly culture dependent (Drory & 
Vigoda-Gadot, 2010), may be a natural phenomenon in organisations (Poon, 2003: 138; 
Zaleznik, 1971) and research on organisational politics has always treated politics as an 
emotional assemble (Othman, 2008: 46).   Vince (2002) states that organisations are ‘political 
containers’ that include individual and collective emotions (2002: 75).  Likewise, Zaleznik 
(1971) refers to organisations as ‘political structures’ in which the careers of employees, 
especially managers, are developed (1971: 53).   Gotsis & Kortezi (2010) argue that political 
concerns can make up an inextricable part of organisational life due to the inevitable power 
systems within (2010: 497).    
In general, a political climate establishes some ethical dilemmas to employees and 
eventually spawns various forms of actions that can be both unjust and unfair (Gotsis & 
Kortezi, 2010: 502).  However, it is important to note that culture affects how an individual 
comprehends and differentiates between actions and therefore, what is considered politically 
negative in one culture may be considered otherwise in another (Kurchner-Hawkins & Miller 
in Vigoda-Gadot & Drory, 2006: 343). 
The often informal nature of organisational politics has been highlighted by several 
writers (Latif et al, 2011: 199; Mintzberg, 1985: 134; Poon, 2003: 139).  In organisations, 
individuals often rely on informal means to make decisions, especially where there is 
uncertainty involved, which presents them with an opportunity to engage in political 
behaviour (Ferris et al, 1989: 151; Gotsis & Kortezi, 2010: 499; Othman, 2008: 43; Poon, 
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2003: 138).  As mentioned in the previous sections, politicking among members of an 
organisation may also occur due to the bare minimum resources available.  This means that 
key people in organisations often ‘bulldoze’ to have what they perceive as a fair share of the 
limited resources available in the organisation for themselves or the group they belong to 
(Ladebo, 2006: 258).  Zaleznik (1971) states that these lack of resources are mostly visible in 
capital budgeting (1971: 56).    
Vredenburgh & Shea Van-Fossen (2010) draw an analogy to Darwin’s ‘survival of 
the fittest’ account of evolution to illustrate how the case of limited resources in 
organisations, those individuals who are highly politically skilled end up being more 
successful in acquiring and controlling the same limited resources (2010: 28).  According to 
Liu et al (in Vigoda-Gadot & Drory, 2006), people who are politically skilled experience the 
perceptions of organisational politics less negatively than others, and may see politicking as a 
rewarding experience and as a sense of proficiency and achievement to their line of work 
(2006: 175). 
 Therefore, political behaviour is characteristically conflict-ridden, often setting 
individual or group employees against the power that is official, established principles and 
expertise, or against each other.  Mintzberg (1985) argues that political behaviours may 
become amplified due to the lack of other systems of influence (1985: 134).  As such, 
political behaviour is mainly concealed and subject to differing perceptions (Curtis, 2003: 
293).   Employees are sensitive to political decisions made in their organisations and 
individuals may react in different emotional and behavioural ways (Vigoda-Gadot & Kapun, 
2005: 258).   
 
Political Behaviour as a Collection of Games 
Henry Mintzberg (1983) is one of the main business leaders, particularly in the 
strategy dominion. Mintzberg (1983) was found to be important for this thesis since in his 
research he presented an extensive review of political behaviour in organisations.  His 
analysis assisted a time of awareness in the empirical study of the phenomenon of 
organisational politics (Meriac & Villanova in Vigoda-Gadot & Drory, 2006), and thus, I 
found his types of political behaviours as ‘illuminating’ as a heuristic tool for understanding 
political behaviours.  According to Mintzberg (in Lemieux, 1998), some of the political 
games, such as the rivalry games between organisational and support staff, may characterize 
persistent patterns of organizational behaviour (1998: 59).  In view of this, the answer may be 
to first identify, as clearly as possible, the particular type of political organisation with which 
one is dealing and then determine the kinds of political games that have been occurring 
within it. 
Mintzberg (1985) presents organisational politics as a Darwinian influence system 
that is exploited by politically skilled individuals to hasten their progression into leadership 
positions (Vredenburgh & Shea Van-Fossen, 2010: 27).  Mintzberg (1983) also states that 
political behaviour is a collection of games that fall into the following four categories:  
authority games, power base games, rivalry games and change games (Curtis, 2003: 295-6).    
These four categories of games are similar to the types of political behaviour identified by 
Sussman et al (2002).   
Mintzberg identifies two types of authority games: those that resist authority, also 
referred to as ‘insurgency games’, and managers that attempt to increase their control over 
the subordinates, also referred to as ‘counterinsurgency games’.  An example of ‘insurgency 
game’ presented by Thoenig and Friedberg (1976) is that of French government engineers 
against a minister who tried to restructure their department (in Mintzberg, 1985: 137).  The 
‘counterinsurgency game’ is played by people with power who retaliate with political or 
legitimate means (Mintzberg, 1985: 137). 
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Power base games are actuated in order for an individual to increase his or her 
organisational power – in this case Mintzberg illustrates six types of power base games; (i) 
the ‘sponsorship game’, (ii) the ‘alliance building game’, (iii) the ‘empire building game’, 
(iv) the ‘budgeting game’, (v) the ‘expertise game’, and (vi) the ‘lording game’.  
The ‘sponsorship game’ involves a person attaching himself or herself to a rising or 
established star and is usually played by those who wish to construct their power base, and 
they do so by using their superiors to acknowledge loyalty in return for power (Mintzberg, 
1985: 137).  The ‘alliance game’ involves peers agreeing to support each other, and is often 
played by line managers who bargain hidden deals of support for each other in order to move 
further up in the organisation (Mintzberg, 1985: 137).  The ‘empire building game’ involves a 
person to engage in more responsibility in decision making, hence increasing his or her 
power and is also played by line managers who wish to build power individually with 
subordinates (Mintzberg, 1985: 137).   
The ‘budgeting game’, which is similar to the ‘empire building game’ but is less 
conflict-ridden since it concerns the fight for resources, is played openly with clear specific 
policies by line managers (Mintzberg, 1985: 137).   The ‘expertise game’ is played by staff 
specialists wherein  experts in a field flaunt the expertise or try to keep the information to 
themselves, while non-experts attempt to have their work seem as expert to be viewed as a 
professional so as to be able to have control over it (Mintzberg, 1985: 137). The ‘lording 
game’ involves people using legitimate power in illegitimate ways with others who lack it 
and is mostly played by line managers and professionals (Mintzberg, 1985: 137). 
In the case of power, Lawrence et al (2005) provide an explanation of two types of 
power in organisations: episodic power and systematic power.  These forms of power offer 
guidance on how organisational politics affect the flow of information between individuals, 
groups and the organisation (Lawrence et al, 2005: 182).  Episodic power refers to distinct 
and premeditated political behaviour that is initiated by self-interested actors who are most 
able to influence organisational decision making (Lawrence et al, 2005: 182).    On the other 
hand, systematic power is directed throughout the social systems within organisations, and 
includes socialisation and accreditation processes.  Some argue that the attention to power 
stems from the fact that social relations and learning processes do not happen in a vacuum but 
take place in a setting of interests and different power positions (Easterby-Smith et al, 2000: 
793). 
The ‘rivalry games’ involve persons or a group ignoring the expertise of another in 
order to make him or her or the group less powerful.  Mintzberg (1985) identifies two types 
of rivalry games, namely ‘line vs. staff’ and ‘rival camps’ (1985: 136).  The ‘line vs. staff’ 
game is described as the game that increases personal power and overpowers a rival wherein 
each side is likely to abuse rightful power in illicit ways (Mintzberg, 1985: 138).  The ‘rival 
camps’ game transpires when the alliance or empire building games result in two main power 
troops and can be the most conflict-ridden game of all, since it can portray conflicts between 
departments or two opposing goals (Mintzberg, 1985: 138).  Vince (2002) provides an 
example of a rivalry game in his action-research of ‘Goodwill Company’.  Here Vince 
illustrates how two sub-systems of the company think that their development initiative is of 
benefit to the company and both find ways to criticise each other’s work, whilst trying to 
avoid working together (2002: 81). 
‘Change games’ are designed to induce organisational change and include ‘whistle 
blowing’, ‘Young Turks’ game and ‘strategic candidates’ game (Mintzberg, 1985: 136).  The 
‘whistle blowing’ is a simple game played mostly by lower status employees to try and affect 
an organisational change in a different way wherein one reports a wrong doing of another in 
the hope to bring about change (Mintzberg, 1985: 138).   Employees in this case may go 
outside the boundaries of the organisation and attempt to involve outsiders (Latif et al, 2011: 
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202).  Likewise, the ‘Young Turks game’ is usually played to replace the people in authority 
while maintaining the system of authority intact, in which a group of revolt employees try to 
cause the downfall of the existing leadership of an organisation (Mintzberg, 1985: 139).  
Similar to this is the ‘Obstructionism’ which entails a tactic by employees in a lower level of 
an organisation that opposes top management policy making decisions (Latif et al, 2011: 
203).  The ‘strategic candidates’ game occurs when individuals or groups seek to affect 
change by campaigning for their own planned contenders through political means by 
coalescing others games such as empire building, alliance building, and rival camps 
(Mintzberg, 1985: 138). 
In his study, Burawoy (1979) refers to the ‘space for games’ concept wherein he 
identified the games played by subordinates to be impulsive, independent and malicious 
construction of workers to breed power contests and divergence with management, though 
games are synchronized, sometimes coercively, by management (Burawoy, 1979: 85-6).  
However, Burawoy (1979) shows that confrontation between managers and subordinates is 
not the sole form of conflict (1979: 65–73).  In this regard, Koski & Järvensivu’s (2010) 
study identified that struggles to introduce new rituals caused tensions between managerial 
levels as well.  The study of Koski & Järvensivu (2010) also identified that games may give 
subordinates more control over work processes, however, on a positive note, the games kept 
the process ongoing and effective, and the workers had the opportunity to show their 
professionalism through these same games (2010: 352).   
  
Final Words 
Organisational politics, as argued by various researchers, can be either positive or 
negative (Othman, 2008: 44).  Othman (2008) mentions these two types in his paper on the 
role of justice, trust and job ambiguity (2008: 44), namely the negative side, which involves 
convenient and illegal behaviour, and the positive side which is a social function that is 
important for organisations to survive (2008: 44).   Negative organisational politics are 
disapproved of because of the ethical dilemmas encrusted with them and the workplace 
conflicts that are generated, whilst positive organisational politics results from the 
amalgamation of shared goals and stimulating collaboration (Drory & Vigoda-Gadot, 2010: 
196; Gotsis & Kortezi, 2010: 509).   
Consequently there are two ways of viewing organisational politics:  either as a 
symptom of social influence processes that benefit the organisation, or a self serving effect 
that goes against the organisational goals (Mintzberg, 1985: 148; Gotsis & Kortezi, 2010: 
498).   Nevertheless, the concept of organisational politics is a key social influence process 
that can be either functional or dysfunctional to employees and organisations (Allen et al, 
1979: 82). 
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